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FROM POVERTY TO ABUSE AND BACK AGAIN:
THE FAILURE OF THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL
SERVICES COMMUNITIES TO PROTECT FOSTER
CHILDREN
Sharon Balmer*
“I don’t know what to say. We just picked the kid up from one crack
house and dropped her off at another.” 1

Stephanie’s life ended as it began, her tiny body wrapped in a plastic bag
and left on a New York City street. 2 When her parents dumped her body
the first time, the plastic prevented her from receiving enough oxygen and
she suffered severe brain damage. The second time Stephanie was
wrapped in plastic and dumped onto the street she died. This time she was
abandoned by her foster mother. Though this foster mother had provided
the foster care agency with glowing recommendations, police investigators
found her home filled with feces, insects, and rodents, and Stephanie’s
medical equipment caked in grime. The foster mother had also canceled
Stephanie’s health services a few months earlier without the agency’s
knowledge. 3
Bruce was found digging through the trash for food because his foster
parents fed him only breakfast cereal, uncooked pancake batter, and peanut
butter. 4 He had been placed in foster care eight years earlier because his

*B.A., Albright College, 2001; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2007;
M.S.W. Candidate, Fordham University Graduate School of Social Services, 2006.
1. Kurt Mundorff, Comment, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment
to Reform Child Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 131, 148 (2003) (a New
York City Administration for Children’s Services caseworker reflects on her first day).
2. Leslie Kaufman, Help, But Not Enough, for Girl Who Was Discarded Twice, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2003, at A1.
3. This is not to say that all foster parents are abusive. Many foster parents are
altruistic people who provide loving homes to children who need them. People choose to
become foster parents for many different reasons, however, including financial ones. See
Mundorff, supra note 1, at 131 (“While I met with some warm, caring foster parents, the
vast majority of foster parents I met were obviously in it for the money. They were baby
boarders.”).
4. Iver Peterson, In Home That Looked Loving, 4 Boys’ Suffering Was Unseen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at A1. This case sparked public outrage that compelled New Jersey to
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biological parents were also starving him. 5 His foster parents even locked
the kitchen to keep him from taking food. 6 Neighbors, foster care agency
caseworkers, and the family’s pastor all described this family positively,
some of whom noted that they were loving and deeply religious.7
After decades of legislative reform, stories like these still appear on the
front pages of our newspapers, and foster children who are injured while in
protective care are turning to the courts to change the system. It is still
relatively difficult for a child to prevail in an action against child protective
workers and agencies. 8 Opinions addressing children’s issues are few, and
courts seem hesitant to expand causes of action. 9 This Comment explores
the current state of children’s legal remedies for injuries incurred as the
result of a foster care placement. Part I describes the foster care system in
the United States. Part II discusses, generally, the possible causes of action
available to foster children. Part III examines the most successful way for
a child to recover damages; a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (“section 1983”) cause of
action for the violation of the constitutional right to safety while in state
custody. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether foster children have
such a right, and district courts are divided about what standard to apply if
a constitutional right to safety even exists for children in foster care.
Finally, Part IV suggests reasons why courts have been reluctant to allow
civil rights actions by children in foster care, and also advocates for a shift
in the way the legal community views children’s issues. Until a consistent
and appropriate standard of care is established, shocking stories of foster
care child abuse will continue to make news around the country.

form an independent panel to overhaul its child protective system. See Leslie Kaufman,
Advocates Paint a Dismal Picture of a Child Welfare Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at
B5; see also Richard Lezin Jones & Leslie Kaufman, Foster Care in New Jersey Is Called
Inept, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at B1 (detailing an advocacy group’s report on New
Jersey’s lack of oversight of foster care); Richard Lezin Jones & Leslie Kaufman, Foster
Care Caseworkers’ Errors Are Detailed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, at B1
(describing the details of foster care records released by the New Jersey Division of Youth
and Family Services). Florida’s child protective system was plagued by scandal in 2002
after it was reported that a five-year-old girl was missing for fifteen months before
caseworkers realized she was gone. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, No Easy Fix For Florida’s
Troubled Child Welfare System, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2002, at A3. New Jersey and
Florida have received national attention for their failures, and most other states are not
faring much better. In 2002, no state met all federal requirements, and sixteen did not meet
any federal requirements. See Robert Pear, U.S. Finds Fault in All 50 States’ Child Welfare
Programs, and Penalties May Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at A16.
5. Peterson, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
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PART I: THE SAD STORY OF FOSTER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
In 2003, over half a million children were living in foster homes. 10 An
increase in drug and alcohol abuse, poverty, and homelessness has led to an
increase in the population of children in foster care. 11 In the simplest
terms, the foster care system is failing its growing population. Some
children’s advocates contend that forty percent of foster children end up on
welfare or in prison, 12 and foster children are sixty-seven times more likely
to be arrested than children who did not grow up in foster care.13 While in
care, children are often shuffled from home to home over the course of
many years, so they are unable to form lasting bonds with any adult.14
They often do not receive proper medical or psychiatric attention,15 though
it is common for foster parents to seek medication to control foster children
more easily. 16 A grand jury in San Diego found a large disparity between
the care of foster children, and that of biological children; the foster
children were given cheaper food and clothing, restricted to certain areas of
the house, and sometimes forbidden to open the refrigerator or watch
television with the family. 17 Most concerning, however, is the fact that
children in foster care are physically abused at a much greater rate than
children in the general population.18
No one knows exactly how many children in foster care are being
abused or neglected, but many suspect that many such cases go

10. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, THE
AFCARS
REPORT
1
(Apr.
2005),
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/afcars/report10.pdf (last visited Oct. 14,
2005). The Department of Health and Human Services reports that 523,000 children were
living in foster homes in 2003. Id. While some cities, particularly New York, have seen a
decrease in the number of children entering the foster care system over the last few years,
rural areas are recording yearly increases as high as sixteen percent. Kate Zernike, A Drug
Scourge Creates Its Own Form of Orphan, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A1. This is
attributed to the growing methamphetamine epidemic. Id.
11. Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the Most
Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 8-9 (1995).
12. Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the Law: The Failure
to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 8 (1999).
13. Id.
14. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 208 (1988).
Program abuse is another form of mistreatment common to foster care. It occurs when the
agency fails to provide children with a stable home environment or provide for medical and
developmental needs. Id. at 207.
15. See Levesque, supra note 11, at 7.
16. See Mundorff, supra note 1, at 160.
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
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unreported. 19 In 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services
reported that the rate of child maltreatment in foster care was more than
seventy-five percent higher than in the general population, and the
mortality rate amongst foster children resulting from maltreatment was
almost 350 percent higher than among children in the general population.20
Another study, conducted between 1986 and 1990 by the National Foster
Care Education Project, found that the incidence of child abuse for children
in foster care was over ten times greater than in the general population.21
Foster care children are also more vulnerable to sexual abuse because,
practically speaking, the incest taboo does not apply within the foster
family structure. 22 The rate of substantiated allegations of sexual abuse is
four times higher for children in foster care than children in the general
population. 23 When accounting for the many cases of abuse and neglect
that go unreported, one author concluded that forty-three percent of all
foster children were in unsuitable foster homes and fifty-seven percent
were at risk of harm in foster care. 24
Paradoxically, children are placed into foster care to protect them from
this kind of abuse. Foster care is designed to be a “temporary, safe haven
for children whose parents are unable to care for them.” 25 It is an
underlying premise of this system that a child’s natural parents can be
rehabilitated, and the foster family is a temporary, stable substitute.26
Unfortunately, most children linger in foster care for longer than expected
and their living situations are anything but stable. 27 Even with recent
legislation aimed at getting foster children into adoptive homes or back
with their parents as soon as possible,28 placing a child into any situation
that is not a “safe haven” could cause serious damage to an already
traumatized child.29 Many caseworkers, however, fear liability or negative
publicity if they leave a child with an abusive parent. 30 Removing children
19. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 205.
20. BARBARA E. HANDSCHU ET AL., NY CIVIL PRACTICE: FAMILY COURT PROCEEDINGS §
46.04(c) (2005).
21. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 206.
22. Id. at 205.
23. Chaifetz, supra note 12, at 7.
24. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 207.
25. Id. at 204.
26. See Levesque, supra note 11, at 5.
27. See id. at 5-7.
28. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
29. Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children From
the Home for Poverty Alone, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 447, 453 (1997).
30. Mundorff, supra note 1, at 152. Often the caseworker who makes the decision to
remove the child immediately shifts the burden of the child’s care to another child protective
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becomes the safer and, because of federal funding policies, more lucrative
choice. 31
While children’s advocates have initiated impact legislation for over
twenty years and federal, state, and local reforms have been numerous, our
child protective systems seem to have a “remarkable immunity to
reform.” 32 The foster care system in this country creates what one court
called a “lost generation of children whose tragic plight is being repeated
every day.” 33 Another court finds “profound disarray in the state’s system
of caring for abused and neglected children.” 34 Increased rates of abuse
and neglect in the foster care system can now be linked to child protective
agencies that do not meet minimum professional standards. 35 There are
few incentives for agencies to do a good job and little to discourage them
from dangerously cutting corners. 36 These failing agencies create
dangerous situations by placing children into homes without first
investigating them beforehand, and without supervising the families after
the placement. 37 Because the Civil Rights Act applies both to those who
violate constitutional rights and those who allow those rights to be violated,
caseworkers and government agencies can all be held legally responsible
when children are injured while in foster care.38

worker who then places the child into a foster home. Still, another worker may then
supervise that placement. Id.
31. Many benefit financially from a child’s placement in foster care. One author
described foster care agencies “vying for their fair share of the market in children” and
caseworkers choosing to remove children after normal working hours to maximize overtime
pay. Id. at 156-60; see also Levesque, supra note 11, at 19 (explaining the effect of the
Child Welfare Act on financial incentives to place children in foster homes).
32. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 212.
33. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
34. K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 1990).
35. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 209.
36. See Christopher Weddle & David Lansner, Liability of Child Protective and Foster
Care Agencies and Caseworkers, in CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS, at 13, 20 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 189, 2002) (noting that “[c]ase
workers who intentionally intimidate and lie to adults they are investigating regarding their
rights and the consequences of the investigation will not be chastised by the courts or
supervisors”).
37. See Mushlin, supra note 14, at 209-11.
38. See Carolyn Kubitschek, Social Worker Malpractice for Failure to Protect Foster
Children, 41 AM. JURISPRUDENCE TRIALS § 1, §§ 4, 14, 17 (2004). Whether the Civil Rights
Act permits a foster child to sue his foster parent is still unaddressed in many circuits,
although the Fourth Circuit has rejected such claims. Id. § 19.
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PART II: WHAT CHILDREN CAN DO: RECOVERING UNDER STATE TORT
LAW AND 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
Because children are both naturally and legally dependant on adults for
protection, there is little that children can do to keep themselves out of
abusive situations, and there is no consistent legal remedy for them to seek
monetary, injunctive, or declaratory relief after they have been injured.
While children have filed actions under state tort laws and federal claims
under section 1983 without great success, 39 federal statutory claims for
violations of substantive due process rights under section 1983 have proven
to be a more successful avenue for children seeking redress for injuries
incurred while in state custody. 40
A. State Tort Claims
In foster care cases, a typical tort claim asserts a common law duty that
one who has taken affirmative steps to rescue another has assumed a
general duty over that person’s safety. 41 Plaintiff foster children claim
under negligence law that the child’s injuries were caused by the failure of
the child protective government worker to act when he or she knew or
should have known the child was at risk. 42 But because tort law does not
usually require a governmental actor to act affirmatively to benefit another,
children may have difficulty establishing a positive duty for a negligence
claim. 43
Even if a child could establish such a claim, she may then have trouble
overcoming governmental immunity. In many states, tort claims are not
available to foster children because of complex state tort statutes that bar

39. See Bryan R. Berry, Crime of Dispassion: Eighth Circuit (Mis)Applies DeShaney in
Failing to Hold State Employees Accountable to the Children They Protect, 66 MO. L. REV.
881, 885 (2001). For a description of 42 U.S.C.A. § 183, see supra notes 61-69 and
accompanying text.
40. See infra Part III for a discussion of the actions that can be brought under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983.
41. See Kubitschek, supra note 38, §§ 24-27 for a discussion of cases upholding liability
under state tort law. There are four theories that form the basis of such liability: government
agencies must use reasonable care in supervising foster children because one must act with
reasonable care; agencies owe a duty to foster children because placing children in foster
care creates a special relationship between the children and the state; an agency’s function is
ministerial and so the agency must act as a reasonable person would; and state statutes
regulating supervision of foster parents give foster children a cause of action when the state
does not properly supervise the foster care placement. Id. § 25.
42. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT § 2.03(2)(b)
(2005); HANDSCHU, supra note 20, § 46.04(3) (discussing breach of contract claims as well).
43. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process
Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 995-1002 (1996).
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claims against government workers.44 In County of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court (In re Terrell R.), the court read California’s Liability of
Public Entities Act narrowly, so as to almost guarantee absolute immunity
for child protective caseworkers where common law had established no
such precedent. 45 The court reasoned that child protective workers were
immune to lawsuits from children injured by their foster parents because
the statutes governing foster care were not meant to protect children from
their foster parents.46
Courts in other states have held that the state’s placement of a child in
foster care and the removal of a child from a home are entitled to
governmental immunity even if done negligently because they are
discretionary acts. 47 The Georgia State Supreme Court, however, held that
the supervision of a child in foster care and the provision of adequate
medical care to foster children were not discretionary functions and, as
such, child protective agencies and workers were liable for failing to fulfill
these duties. 48 New York’s highest court has also allowed foster children
to plead claims under common law tort without being precluded by
governmental immunity. 49
B. Section 1983 Claims for Violations of Federal Child Welfare
Statutes
Children have not fared much better in seeking relief for violations of
the massive federal statutory regulations that govern the foster care system.

44. See Austen L. Parrish, Avoiding the Mistakes of Terrell R.: The Undoing of the
California Tort Claims Act and the Move to Absolute Governmental Immunity in Foster
Care Placement and Supervision, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 295 (2004).
45. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637, 645-56 (Ct. App. 2002).
46. Id. at 646.
47. E.g., Jackson v. Dep’t of Human Res., 497 S.E.2d 58, 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that placing children in foster care is a discretionary act and entitled to
governmental immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act); Gloria G. v. State Dep’t of
Soc. Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 987 (Kan. 1992) (holding that the discretionary function
exception of the Kansas Tort Claims Act provides immunity to caseworkers for removing a
child from foster care); Williams v. Horton, 437 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the defendant caseworker had immunity under the Michigan Tort Claims Act
because placing a child in a foster home is a discretionary function). Discretionary acts
have been defined as those that require the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment.
Mauricia Allen, The Georgia Tort Claims Act: A License for Negligence in Child
Deprivation Cases?, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 795, 805-20 (2002).
48. See Edwards v. Dep’t of Children & Youth Servs., 525 S.E.2d 83, 86 (Ga. 2000);
Brantley v. Dep’t of Human Res., 523 S.E.2d 571, 575 (Ga. 1999).
49. Mark G. v. Sabol, 93 N.Y.2d 710, 722 (N.Y. 1999). For a thorough discussion of
Mark G., see Beth A. Diebel, Note, Mark G. v. Sabol: Substantive Due Process Rights, A
Possibility for Foster Care in New York, 64 ALB. L. REV. 823 (2000).
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In the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA),
Congress set out to federalize state-run agencies by implementing a
comprehensive regulatory structure to protect children and reduce the
amount of time spent in foster care by moving children toward permanency
through adoption or reunification with their biological parents.50 But, in
Suter v. Artist M., the Supreme Court, held that the AACWA could not be
enforced through a section 1983 action and did not create an implied
private right of action. 51 The Court reasoned that, because Congress only
used the vague “reasonable efforts” standard to define a caseworker’s duty
to a child while using more specific language elsewhere in the statute, it
had not intended to create a private right of action. 52 After Suter, Congress
amended the AACWA to state that a provision of the Act could not be
deemed unenforceable by its inclusion in a section of the Act that did not
contain specific language. 53 Circuit courts are divided over whether this
amendment creates a private right of action for children under the
AACWA, 54 and the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to hear
and settle the dispute.
In 1996, because many of AACWA’s provisions had proven ineffective,
Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA). 55 ASFA
focuses specifically on the well-being of children in foster care above all
other concerns. 56 It stresses that the temporary nature of foster care
requires that caseworkers plan for the child’s future as soon as he or she
enters care. 57 ASFA also contains enforcement mechanisms, including a
requirement that states must report data on the children in their care,;
conditional financing based on strict compliance with ASFA; and the

50. See Levesque, supra note 11, at 14-17; see also Braveman & Ramsey, supra note
29, at 452.
51. 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992).
52. Id. at 363.
53. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-2 (2005).
54. See Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional Standards for the
State’s Duty to Protect Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 385, 387 (1996). Compare
Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
the amendment required courts to look to pre-Suter law for possible causes of action under
AACWA), and Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268, 1284 (E.D. Wis.
1995) (holding for a limited cause of action under AACWA), with Eric L. ex rel. Schierberl
v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 311 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that for children’s rights to be
privately enforceable under the AACWA, Congress will have to clarify those rights), and
Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476, 483-84 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that the
amendment did not overrule Suter).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (2005).
56. See Judge Ernestine Steward Gray, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997:
Confronting an American Tragedy, 46 LA. B.J. 477, 478 (1999).
57. Id.
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incorporation of a strict definition of “reasonable efforts.” 58 The Supreme
Court has never ruled on whether a private right of action exists under
ASFA, but some circuit courts have addressed the issue. For example, the
Seventh Circuit determined that ASFA created rights that children could
enforce under section 1983 because the law was clearly intended to benefit
children in foster care.59 But in 2003, the Eleventh Circuit ruled against
such a right of action, holding that ASFA does not contain “rights-creating
language.” 60
C. Section 1983 Claims for Violations of Substantive Due Process
Rights
Because of the limited success of state law and federal statutory claims,
children have begun to turn to actions claiming violations of constitutional
rights under section 1983. 61 This statute permits the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to protect individual liberty
from unjustified intrusions by state government. 62 While the due process
clause usually keeps states from actively infringing on individual rights, the
Supreme Court has held that in “certain limited circumstances, the
Constitution imposes upon states affirmative duties of care and protection
with respect to particular individuals.”63 This duty stems not from the
identity of the abusive party or from states’ knowledge of the abuse, but
from state-imposed limits on the injured party’s freedom to protect his own
interests. 64
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from deprivations of
life, liberty, and property. 65 Created to allow individuals to assert
Fourteenth Amendment civil rights claims against the government, section
1983 states that one acting under the color of state law is subject to liability
if he or she deprives another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution. 66 It does not create new substantive due process rights,
but allows individuals to recover if previously established rights are
58. Id. at 479-80.
59. Jeanine B., No. 93-C-0547, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12091, at *12.
60. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).
61. See Scott J. Preston, Casenote: “Can you Hear Me?”: The Unites States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit Addresses the Systematic Deficiencies of the Philadelphia
Child Welfare System in Baby Neal v. Casey, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1653, 1670-71 (1996).
62. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2005).
63. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 (1989).
64. Id. at 200.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986) (citing several cases in the Court’s substantial due process jurisprudence).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
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violated. 67 To bring a Section 1983 cause of action, the plaintiff must
establish both that the defendant was a state actor and that the defendant’s
act violated a constitutional right or caused a right to be violated.68 To
overcome the defense of governmental qualified immunity, plaintiffs must
also show that the constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time
the events occurred. 69
1) The Development of the Right to Safety in State Custody
The right to safety in state custody emerged in the 1970s. Before this,
the “hands-off” doctrine kept courts from reviewing prison issues and
enforcing a right to safety. 70 In 1976, however, following the civil rights
movement of the 1960s, the Court rejected the “hands-off” doctrine and
recognized a constitutional right to safety for prison inmates. 71 In Estelle v.
Gamble, a prison inmate charged that correction officials violated his
Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by
failing to provide him with adequate medical care.72 The Court held that
the state is constitutionally required to care for individuals who have been
deprived of their liberty by the state and that the state could not be
deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s health or safety. 73 The Court
clarified, however, that an “inadvertent failure to provide medical care
cannot constitute” a deprivation of a right. 74 To meet the deliberate
indifference standard established in Estelle, an inmate must “allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference” and
“offend evolving standards of decency.” 75
In 1982, the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to safety
in another setting; in Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court held that mental
patients institutionalized in state hospitals had a right to safe conditions and
basic services rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.76
The Court found that if it was cruel to hold criminals in unsafe conditions,
“it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed—who
67. See Kubitschek, supra note 38, § 4.
68. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
70. See Mushlin, supra note 14, at 219. The “hands-off” doctrine was created to keep
federal courts away from prison matters, as “prisons were considered the exclusive domain
of the Congress and of the state governments.” Id.
71. 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
72. Id. at 98.
73. Id. at 104-05.
74. Id. at 105-06.
75. Id. at 106.
76. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
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may not be punished at all—in unsafe conditions.” 77 Instead of applying
the deliberate indifference standard formulated in Estelle, the Court in
Youngberg articulated a new standard: the professional judgment
standard. 78 The professional judgment standard is determined by balancing
the state’s interest against the liberty interests of the patient.79 The
Youngberg Court held that a violation of professional judgment must
exhibit a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually
did not base the decision on such a judgment.” 80 The Court limited its
decision by requiring deference to the judgment actually exercised and
allowing exceptions to liability if the professional can show his behavior
was due to budgetary constraints. 81
2) When Does a Child Have a Right to Safety? The Supreme Court’s
Controversial Decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on whether foster care
constitutes state custody, or whether children in foster care have a
constitutional right to safety. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, the Court found that there was no right to
safety for Joshua, who had been beaten to the point of irreversible brain
damage by his biological father.82 Although Joshua was in his father’s
physical custody, child protective caseworkers were assigned to work with
the family after numerous reports of abuse were made to the Winnebago
Department of Social Services (DSS). 83 The DSS caseworkers had seen
and recorded many signs that Joshua was being abused, but did nothing to
protect him even after he was admitted to the emergency room with injuries
typical of child abuse. 84 While the Court acknowledged that these
circumstances were tragic, it held that the State had not acted to deprive
Joshua of his liberty. 85 Because Joshua had remained in his father’s
77. Id. at 315-16.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 321-22.
80. Id. at 323.
81. Id.
82. 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989).
83. Id. at 192. The child protective caseworkers suggested that Joshua be enrolled in a
preschool, that his father’s girlfriend move out of the home, and that his father participate in
anger management counseling. Id. at 192. Joshua’s father did not adhere to any of these
recommendations. Id. at 193.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 199-203.
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custody, no special relationship arose to create an affirmative duty of
protection under the due process clause. 86 The Court emphasized that
Joshua’s father was a private actor and the State played no role in creating
the harm that befell him. 87
But, “[p]oor Joshua!,” Justice Blackmun wrote in his dissent to the
Blackmun advocated an
majority’s much criticized opinion. 88
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that would undo the
formalistic legal reasoning that keeps courts from “recognizing either the
facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those
facts.” 89 He suggested that this can be done by understanding that
“compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.” 90 The
majority did share some of this compassion; in what has now become a
famous footnote, on which many circuit courts have based a right to safety
in foster care, 91 the majority opinion provided that “[h]ad the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from free society and
placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a
situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to
give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”92 Based on this footnote, lower
courts have created two exceptions to DeShaney’s block on liability for
affirmative duties: the state-created danger exception and the special
relationship exception. 93 The state-created danger exception allows
children to recover damages when the state either places them in or returns
them to a known dangerous situation. 94 The special relationship exception

86. Id.
87. Id. at 201.
88. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 212.
90. Id. at 213.
91. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 991-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Meador
v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990); Lewis v. Neal, 905 F. Supp.
228, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
92. DeShaney, at 201 n.9.
93. See Berry, supra note 39, at 895.
94. See generally Michele Miller, Revisiting Poor Joshua: State-Created Danger
Theory in the Foster Care Context, 11 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243 (2000) (providing a full
discussion of the state-created danger theory). This theory of liability is usually posed when
children are returned to unfit biological parents who then abuse them. Id. at 244. It has
been applied in foster care cases as well, but with limited success. See M.B. ex rel. T.B. v.
City of Philadelphia, No. 00-5223, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2999, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3,
2003) (allowing recovery under the state-created danger theory for a child who was
physically tortured when returned to his mother); but see Olivia Y. ex rel. Johnson v.
Barbour, 351 F. Supp. 2d 543, 553-54 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (dismissing a claim brought on
behalf of abused and neglected children based on the Fifth Circuit’s consistent rejection of
the state-created danger theory).

BALMERCHRISTENSEN

2005

2/3/2011 10:05 PM

FOSTER FAILURE

113

allows children to recover when the state creates a special relationship by
taking physical and legal custody of the child.95 Though foster children
have asserted causes of action under both of these theories, this Comment
focuses primarily on the special relationship theory because of its greater
use and greater success.
While the Supreme Court has only reviewed right-to-safety cases
involving prison inmates and mental patients, lower courts have long held
that the doctrine applies in situations involving foster children injured
while in care. 96 The Supreme Court, however, explicitly held back from
determining whether it approved of the line of cases holding that foster care
created a special relationship between the state and the foster child.97 The
Court also declined to specify what standard it would apply if a right to
safety did exist for children in foster care.98 The Court, therefore, left the
door open for circuit courts to determine whether foster children are
entitled to a right to safety, as well as to define the applicable standard of
care.
PART III: AFTER DESHANEY: DO CHILDREN HAVE A RIGHT TO SAFETY
IN STATE CUSTODY? THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT
Having unlimited freedom or the ability to exercise all of the rights
enjoyed by adults is not generally in a child’s best interest. Few would
challenge the proposition, however, that children are not property and are
entitled to basic human rights.99 Outside the foster care system, children

95. See, e.g., Reiser v. District of Columbia, 563 F.2d 462, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(finding that a parole officer had a special duty to inform the owners of the apartment
complex where the parolee worked of parolee’s dangerous propensity); Semler v.
Psychiatric Instit. of D.C., 538 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that a probation order
created a special relationship between the public and the mental hospital that had approved
the release of a dangerous patient); see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing “special relationships” which
may give rise to affirmative duties to act under the common law of tort).
96. See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (holding that when the state involuntarily places a child in the custodial environment
of foster care, it assumes a constitutional duty to ensure the safety of that environment).
97. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9; see also Taylor, 818 F.2d at 798 (“The relationship
between state officials charged with carrying out a foster child care program and the
children in the program is an important one involving substantial duties and, therefore,
substantial rights.”).
98. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
99. The United States is far behind other nations in recognizing children’s basic rights.
See Jim Weill, The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Well-Being of America’s
Children, 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 257, 257 (1988). Though the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child was the most broadly and rapidly ratified human
rights treaty, the United States is the only country with an internationally recognized
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often rely on their parents to advocate for their interests. 100 When the state
takes legal custody of a child by placing him or her in foster care, however,
it assumes the unique position of becoming that child’s legal parent.
Parens patriae, literally “parent of his or her country,” 101 describes the
government’s authority over and responsibility for the protection of
children. 102 Because the state actively assumes this parental role, it also
takes on the duty to advocate for and ensure the safety of the children in its
care.
In DeShaney, the Court held that the state is required to provide
individuals in state custody with basic human needs, such as “food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety . . . .” 103 While most
circuit courts require states to meet children’s basic needs, they articulate a
standard for showing a failure to meet them in different ways. Circuits
apply the “deliberate indifference standard,” the “professional judgment
standard,” or a mix of the two. 104 When deciding which standard to apply,
some courts have considered whether the plaintiff seeks monetary
damages, or simply injunctive or declaratory relief.105
A. When and Where Kids Are Safe: Most Circuits Uphold the Right to
Safety for Children in Foster Care
Compassion is not completely exiled from the province of judging, as
one district court in the Twelfth Circuit demonstrated in holding that “it
taxes the powers of the Court’s imagination to fathom what would violate
the [C]onstitution if not the deliberate indifference to the gruesome and
government that has not yet ratified it. Id. at 257. Children in the United States are more
likely to be victims of child prostitution and illegal labor than children in any other Western
country. Id. at 260. They are also more likely to use drugs or become pregnant. Id. at 260.
100. Id. at 261.
101. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 511 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
102. See Gray, supra note 56, at 477 n.1. Parens Patriae is historically recognized as the
state’s interest in promoting the welfare of children. Id.
103. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
104. See infra Part III.B.
105. See, e.g., LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(finding that the deliberate indifference standard may be warranted when plaintiffs are
seeking money damages); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, No. 02-CV-1686-MHS, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (applying the professional
judgment standard because plaintiffs were not seeking monetary relief). This Comment
focuses mainly on children’s actions against caseworkers in their individual capacities.
Many children bring suits against caseworkers because it is much more difficult to prove the
liability of governmental agencies or states. Section 1983 differs from common law tort
actions because it does not allow the use of respondeat superior. Kubitschek, supra note
38, § 17. Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine that makes an employer liable for an
employee’s wrongdoing. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 609 (2d Pocket ed. 2001).
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unfettered torture of a helpless little boy . . . . “ 106 The Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits agree and recognize a child’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
safety while in foster care.107
In 1981, the Second Circuit was the first to establish that children had
some right to safety while in state custody. 108 In Doe v. New York City
Department of Social Services, the court found caseworkers could be
subject to liability for failing to perform custodial duties that were assigned
to them. 109 In this case, the plaintiff foster child had been sexually abused
by her foster father for a number of years. 110 Though child protective
workers grew increasingly suspicious of the foster father’s strange
behavior, they did not investigate their suspicions or make the mandatory
visits to the home. 111 Moreover, they failed to include required
information, such as the foster child’s many absences from school and a
psychiatrist’s recommendations, in their reports. 112 The court found these
workers were deliberately indifferent to the welfare of the plaintiff foster
child because their failures to act were the proximate cause of her
subsequent abuse. 113
Circuit courts have expanded this basic right not to be handed over to an
abusive party to include the right to be protected from a “knowing
placement in an unsupervised and abusive foster care environment,” 114 the
right to reasonably safe living conditions,115 and the right to be protected
from psychological, emotional, and physical harm. 116 Some courts have

106. Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
107. E.g., Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
380 F.3d 872, 879-80 (5th Cir. 2004); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 807-08 (3d Cir. 2000);
Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993);
Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir.
1992); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992 ( D.C. Cir. 1991); Meador v. Cabinet
for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914
F.2d 846, 858 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th
Cir. 1987) (en banc); Doe v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
1981).
108. Doe, 649 F.2d at 141.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 137.
111. Id. at 139.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 145.
114. Taahira W. ex rel. McCord-Salley v. Travis, 908 F. Supp. 533, 539-40 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (where a young girl was placed into a home containing another foster child who had a
propensity to sexually abuse other children).
115. Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
116. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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even held that the right to safety includes the right to basic services, such as
case planning and appropriate placements with conditions that are
reasonably related to the purpose of the placement. 117 To ensure that
children’s rights are not violated, caseworkers must continue to monitor the
foster care placements, 118 investigate any suspicions that abuse may be
occurring, and determine the needs of the children in their care. 119 Though
a single act of abuse may not violate a child’s right to safety, a pattern of
incidents can establish that the state did not fulfill its duty to provide
reasonable safety to a child in its care. 120
Though the courts seem to be expanding what sort of harm constitutes a
violation of a child’s rights, some courts still take a narrow view of what
constitutes “state custody,” and, in effect, being eligible for protection from
the state’s actions.121 In Burton v. Richmond, the Eighth Circuit found that
children who were placed with their grandparents after their mother
abandoned them did not have a right to safety because no special
relationship had been created, even though the state was monitoring the
placement and providing services. 122 The court found that the children
were not in state custody because the family made the original custodial
arrangements and the state had simply helped the family take children away
from an abusive mother. 123 Courts have also held that no special
relationship exists when children are voluntarily placed into care by their

117. Id.; see also Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289,
293 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a child has the right to medical care as well as protection
and supervision); Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that children have a right to services that relate to the purpose of their placement). But see
Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1296-98 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a caseworker does
not have the duty to protect a child from gang violence because this is beyond the
reasonable control of the foster parent); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476, 506
(D.N.J. 2000) (holding that children did not have the right to be held in the least restrictive
setting and may remain in care unnecessarily); Angela L. v. Children & Youth Servs. of
Lawrence County, 987 F. Supp. 418, 424 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a caseworker does
not have the duty to protect a foster child from getting pregnant at age fourteen); B.H. v.
Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1397-98 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the right to safety does
not include the right to be provided with an “optimal level of care”).
118. Taylor, 818 F.2d at 815.
119. Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F. Supp. 367, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
120. Nina S. ex rel. Tyler v. Gray, No. 96-1303, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8824, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. June 24, 1996).
121. See Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Nicini v.
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the analogy between foster children
and prisoners and mental patients is incomplete because foster children have more freedom
and can ensure their own safety).
122. See 370 F.3d at 730.
123. Id. at 727.
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parents. 124 Other courts and many children’s advocates disagree with these
holdings, however, claiming that foster care is never voluntary for
children. 125
Three circuits have not yet allowed children to succeed in section 1983
actions for violations of a constitutional right to safety. The Fourth Circuit
has held that a constitutional right to safety while in state custody does not
exist for children in foster care, 126 and the First and Ninth Circuits have
never directly addressed the issue. 127 In Marr v. Maine Department of
Human Services, the First Circuit assumed, but did not decide, that a
constitutional right to safety existed for children in foster care.128 The
court dismissed the case, however, because it found that the defendants (a
government agency and agency employees) were considered “arms of the
state” and thus not people within the reach of Section 1983. 129 In Miller v.
Gammie, the Ninth Circuit recently overruled a decision that had given
child protective workers absolute immunity for a wide range of activities,
and, therefore, circumvented any Section 1983 claims against them. 130 The
court held that activities involving “discretionary decisions and
recommendations that are not functionally similar to prosecutorial or
judicial decisions” do not have a historical claim to absolute immunity and
are entitled only to qualified immunity. 131 This decision opens the door for
children in the Ninth Circuit to bring cases for violations of a right to
safety. 132
124. A voluntary placement occurs when a child’s parents consent to the child being
placed in foster care. See Milburn ex rel. Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 871 F.2d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 1989); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476, 506
(D.N.J. 2000).
125. See Miracle ex rel. Miracle v. Spooner, 978 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(stating that the voluntary/involuntary distinction does not matter, because from the child’s
perspective, foster care is always involuntary); Lewis v. Neal, 905 F. Supp. 228, 232 (E.D.
Pa. 1995) (holding that for all practical purposes a child is not free to leave her placement
even if the placement was voluntary). For a discussion on voluntary placements, see
Mushlin, supra note 14, at 238-42.
126. See White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997); Milburn, 871 F.2d at
476.
127. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003); Marr v. Me. Dep’t of
Human Servs. No. 01-224-B-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7378, at *7 (D. Me. Apr. 24, 2002).
128. Marr, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7378, at *7 (stating the court was assuming the right
existed for this case only); see also Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303, 307 (D.N.H. 1994)
(holding that though the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had not decided whether
foster children had a constitutional right to safety, principles other circuits used to analogize
Youngberg to foster care situations were persuasive).
129. See Marr, No. 01-224-B-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7378, at *7.
130. 335 F.3d at 893 (overruling Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989)).
131. Id. at 898.
132. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit did explicitly hold that there is no right to safety for
children placed in foster care within that circuit, citing the absence of
controlling Supreme Court authority. 133 In Milburn v. Anne Arundel
County Department of Social Services, the court held that foster parents
were private actors, and a foster child in their care was not in state
custody. 134 This holding preempted the court from ever considering
whether the child protective workers could be held liable for the actions or
failure to act because it held that no special relationship arose to create an
affirmative duty to protect the child.135 Though Milburn based some of its
reasoning on the fact that the child had been voluntarily placed in foster
care by her parents, the court later extended its holding to include all foster
care children. 136
B. What Standard Is Most Applicable to the Foster Care Setting?
Professional Judgment Versus Deliberate Indifference
Circuit courts are split over what sort of behavior on the part of agencies
would violate a child’s rights. Circuits apply the deliberate indifference
standard articulated in Estelle, the professional judgment standard from
Youngberg, and a mix of the two. Because the link between caseworkers’
actions or failures to act and the harm caused is more attenuated than in
many other situations, proving causation can be difficult for children
injured in foster care. 137 Generally, caseworkers’ actions must have been a
substantial factor in the harm that occurred.138 Due to the unique situation
foster children face, a new standard tailored to the specific expectations of
children placed in state foster care should be created. 139

133. White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Fourth
Circuit “had squarely held that children placed in foster care had no federal constitutional
right to state protection”).
134. 871 F.2d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 1989). The Milburn Court determined that the state had
no duty to protect an individual from private violence because states are not traditionally
responsible for the foster care business. Id. at 476; but see K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan,
914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the state could not shirk its responsibility to
provide for those in its custody by delegating that responsibility to irresponsible parties).
135. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 477. In Milburn, the court examined the contract between the
agency and the foster family. It found that the contract did not turn the foster family into
state actors, because it was too general and the foster family received no compensation. Id.
For more discussion on foster parents as state actors, see Karen Yiu, Comment, Foster
Parents as State Actors in Section 1983 Actions: What Rayburn v. Hogue Missed, 7 U.C.
DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 117 (2003).
136. See White, 112 F.3d at 738.
137. See Kubitschek, supra note 38, § 11.
138. Id.
139. See infra notes 187-192 and accompanying text.
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1) The Deliberate Indifference Standard
The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits generally use the harsher
deliberate indifference standard set out in Estelle v. Gamble. 140 Deliberate
indifference is a “state of mind” demonstrated by a deliberate lack of
concern for an individual’s welfare. 141 Though the Estelle Court held that
for conduct to be deliberately indifferent it must offend “the evolving
standards of decency,” circuit courts have articulated the standard
differently in cases involving foster children.142
In Doe, the Second Circuit articulated a standard whereby deliberate
indifference is demonstrated by a state actor’s inattention to a known risk
or facts from which risk can be inferred. 143 This standard can be met by
demonstrating a pattern of omissions that establish a caseworker’s failure
to perform specific duties; 144 actual knowledge of a specific, impending
harm is not always needed. 145 If the risk of harm is obvious or can easily
be inferred from known facts, one can assume that it was consciously
disregarded by the state actors.146 While gross negligence does not by
itself constitute deliberate indifference, it may create a strong presumption
of its existence. 147
Courts applying the deliberate indifference standard have acknowledged
that it is a “significantly high burden for plaintiffs to overcome.”148
Fortunately, some courts have allowed repeated omissions on the part of

140. See, e.g. Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 880 (5th Cir. 2004); Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1993); Doe v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d
134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981).
141. See Kubitschek, supra note 38, § 22.
142. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)). Compare Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (1976), with Doe, 649 F.2d at 142 (holding
that the standard must be applied differently because of the amount of contact a caseworker
has with a child and foster family is more limited than in institutional settings, like prisons
and mental hospitals).
143. Doe, 649 F.2d at 142.
144. Id.; see also Daniel H. ex rel. Hardaway H. v. City of New York, 115 F. Supp. 2d
423, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
145. See Daniel H., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 430. Though the Eleventh Circuit has held that
“subjective knowledge” is enough to prove liability, it has also held that a state actor must
be objectively aware of a risk or “deliberately failed to learn” of it. Compare S.M. v. Feaver,
No. 03-80567-Civ-Hurley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1645, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2004),
with Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004).
146. Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380
F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that if the facts show an obvious risk of abuse to a
foster child, then deliberate indifference exists).
147. Doe, 649 F.2d at 143.
148. Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 882.
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caseworkers, such as failure to make the required number of home visits to
monitor placements, failure to adequately screen foster parents, or failure to
meet other statutory duties to form the basis of liability. 149
2) The Professional Judgment Standard
Courts in the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits generally evaluate
the government’s actions under the professional judgment standard set
forth in Youngberg v. Romero. 150 Under this approach, the court must
decide if the judgment that resulted in harm was made using the
defendant’s professional skills. 151 As long as a judgment was made
appropriately using professional skills, it is presumed to be valid.152 A
caseworker is not liable for every decision that does not turn out well, just
those that exhibit a departure from professional standards. 153 The test for
determining whether a defendant failed to exercise bona fide professional
judgment has four parameters. 154 The plaintiff must show that the worker
failed to exercise professional judgment, that the worker’s actions or
omissions showed a lack of reasonable supervision, that the injury suffered
was reasonably foreseeable, and that there was a casual link between the
injury and the failure to supervise. 155 Like deliberate indifference, actual
knowledge of impeding harm is not needed. A lack of professional
judgment can be demonstrated by a worker’s mere misconduct. 156 Many
149. See, e.g. Miracle ex rel. Miracle v. Spooner, 978 F. Supp. 1161, 1170 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (citing Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir. 1997)); see
also Weddle & Lansner, supra note 36, at 81-83; but see Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 812
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a caseworker’s failure to do a background check on foster
parents did not constitute deliberate indifference because the caseworker had no reason to
suspect that the parents would have a record).
150. See, e.g., Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883,
893-94 (10th Cir. 1992); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
151. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982). But see Bailey v. Pancheo, 108
F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1224-39 (D.N.M. 2000) (looking instead to each defendant’s personal
history to determine if that defendant was a “professional” and therefore could escape
liability because a professional’s judgment is presumptively valid).
152. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23. In fact, it is not a judge’s job to pick which of many
professional judgments is the correct one. Id.
153. T.M. ex rel. Cox v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1191 (D. Wyo. 2000) (finding that
expert testimony should be used to determine the bounds of acceptable conduct, which
should be based on a professional judgment standard); Wendy H. ex rel. Smith v. City of
Philadelphia, 849 F. Supp. 367, 372 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“[L]iability should attach only when
the defendant failed to meet ‘professionally accepted minimum standards.’”).
154. Taahira W. ex rel. McCord-Salley v. Travis, 908 F. Supp. 533, 540 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(citing Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995)).
155. Id.
156. Wendy H., 849 F. Supp. at 374 (finding that requiring actual knowledge would turn
the professional judgment standard on its head because caseworkers could simply claim they
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circuits applying the professional judgment standard, however, have
required defendants to “act in a manner which avails them to that
notice.” 157
Although the courts have not provided a distinct definition for what
professional judgment is, they have provided some guidance. For example,
courts have held that failure to properly screen, license, and train foster
parents and investigate and respond to allegations of abuse could
demonstrate a failure to meet professional standards. 158 Omissions, like
the failure to visit the foster home, maintain contact with the family, or read
school or psychiatric evaluations, have also been held to demonstrate a lack
of professional judgment. 159 Courts have further held that “mere
negligence” will not by itself constitute a violation of the professional
judgment standard. 160 In some cases, expert testimony may be needed to
determine if the defendant’s actions fall within the scope of professional
judgment. 161
3) When a Circuit Can’t Decide: Inconsistently Applying Both Standards
The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have applied both the
deliberate indifference and the professional judgment standards.162 Until
2000, district courts in the Third Circuit applied the professional judgment
standard, 163 finding that it better applied to foster children’s situations than
the deliberate indifference standard. 164 But in 2000, the Court of Appeals

did not know); see also LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. Supp. 2d 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Even if defendants
did not have actual knowledge of the harm or risk, evidence of simple misconduct toward
plaintiffs is actionable.”).
157. Wendy H., 849 F. Supp. at 373; see also T.M., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1191; Nina S. ex rel.
Tyler v. Gray, No. 96-1303, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8824, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1996).
But see Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was no
duty for a caseworker to make an inquiry).
158. See, e.g., Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 1:02-cv-1686-MHS, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27025, at *16-17 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004); see also Christine M. Dine, Comment,
Protecting Those Who Cannot Protect Themselves: State Liability for Violation of Foster
Children’s Right to Safety, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 523 (2002) (enumerating the
professional standards of caseworkers).
159. Wendy H., 849 F. Supp. at 375.
160. E.g., Taahira W., 908 F. Supp. at 543 (“Nor does the court suggest that a
caseworker’s mere negligence will give rise to liability.”).
161. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323 n.31.
162. See infra notes 163-177 and accompanying text.
163. See Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. Supp. 2d 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Nina S.
ex rel. Tyler v. Gray, No. 96-1303, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8824, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 24,
1996); Wendy H., 849 F. Supp. at 372.
164. See, e.g., Jordan, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (applying the professional judgment
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for the Third Circuit applied the deliberate indifference standard rather than
the professional judgment standard without mentioning the Circuit’s
history of applying the latter in foster care cases. 165
The Sixth Circuit has progressed in the opposite direction. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals first held that deliberate indifference was “clearly
established” as the proper standard.166 In 2000, however, a district court in
that circuit found that though deliberate indifference had been used in other
contexts, such as in cases involving prison inmates, the professional
judgment standard was most appropriate for cases involving foster care
children. 167 The court made no mention of its previous application of the
deliberate indifference standard.168
In Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, a district court in the Eleventh
Circuit departed from the circuit’s clear establishment of deliberate
indifference as the standard within that Circuit. 169 The court acknowledged
the Eleventh Circuit’s long history of applying the deliberate indifference
standard, 170 but found that this history was not controlling because the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had never explicitly held that deliberate
indifference was the correct standard for cases involving children in foster
care. 171 The court also distinguished the case because the plaintiff was
seeking only injunctive and declaratory relief while other cases involved
monetary damages as well.172
The path the Seventh Circuit has taken in cases involving foster care

standard); Nina S., No. 96-1303, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8824, at *5 (noting that the
professional judgment standard “is the proper standard of care owed to a child in foster
care”); Wendy H., 849 F. Supp. at 372 (applying the professional judgment standard).
165. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir. 2000).
166. Lintz v. Skipsi, 25 F.3d 304, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1994). This court inexplicably cited
Youngberg, however, to establish the deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 305.
167. Brian A. ex rel. Brooks v. Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941, 953-54 (M.D. Tenn.
2000).
168. Id.
169. No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *13-18 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
11, 2004).
170. See Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor); Taylor ex
rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); S.M. v. Feaver,
No-03-80567-Civ-Hurley, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1645, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2004)
(citing Taylor); Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1343 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (citing Taylor); Rhodes-Courter ex rel. Courter v. Thompson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1362 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Taylor); Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Farnesi, 70 F. Supp. 2d
1334, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (citing Taylor); Miracle ex rel. Miracle v. Spooner, 978 F.
Supp. 1161, 1170 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing Taylor).
171. See Kenny A., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *14.
172. Id. at 14-15; see also LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 996 n.29 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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children is probably the most perplexing. Many consider the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan 173 to be the definitive
articulation of the professional judgment standard, and courts in other
circuits have cited this opinion when applying professional judgment in
cases involving foster children.174 Despite this precedent, courts in the
Seventh Circuit have slowly moved toward applying deliberate indifference
rather than professional judgment, with some courts even citing to K.H. as
precedent for the former. 175 The Seventh Circuit recently held that
applying the professional judgment standard would effectively overrule the
K.H. decision. 176 This court found that K.H. meant for professional
judgment to be only a starting point, not a threshold.177
Even if the circuits agreed on a standard, there would still be confusion
among them. The difference between the two standards is unclear, 178 and
many courts do not seem to realize that more than one standard exists. 179
Between circuits, and even within some circuits, the language used to
articulate the standards varies greatly. 180 The Tenth Circuit even expressed
doubt over whether there was a meaningful difference between the
standards at all. 181

173. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
174. See Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893-94
(10th Cir. 1992) (citing Morgan before adopting the professional judgment standard);
Wendy H. ex rel. Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F. Supp. 367, 371-72 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(citing Morgan before applying the professional judgment standard). Often quoted is the
K.H. Court’s remark that “child welfare workers and their supervisors have a safe haven
from liability when they exercise a bona fide professional judgment as to where to place
children in their custody.” 914 F.2d at 854.
175. See J.H. & J.D. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2003)
(applying a “modified” deliberate indifference standard); Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768,
776 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying what seems to be deliberate indifference); Mabel A. ex rel.
Murphy v. Woodward, No. 97C 1634, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1009, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14,
1998) (applying deliberate indifference).
176. J.H. & J.D., 346 F.3d at 792.
177. Id. at 792-93.
178. See Kearse, supra note 54, at 392-405.
179. See, e.g., Norfleet ex rel. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293
(8th Cir. 1993) (discussing only deliberate indifference); Meador v. Cabinet for Human
Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (discussing only deliberate indifference standard).
180. See Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 293; Meador, 902 F.2d at 476; see also Taylor ex rel.
Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (finding a liberty interest
by analogizing Youngberg, but applying Estelle’s deliberate indifference); Bailey v.
Pacheco, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1219-20 (D.N.M. 2000) (finding that professional judgment
creates more of a burden on the state to act or less of a burden in explaining their actions).
181. Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th
Cir. 1992).
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4) Children Are Unique: A New Standard of Care Is Needed
Neither deliberate indifference nor professional judgment is an
appropriate standard to apply to children. These standards are vague,
inconsistent, and cumbersome, and they were not created to address the
specific needs of children. The Supreme Court used Estelle and Youngberg
to hint that foster care might be a form of state custody to demonstrate the
possible existence of a right, but did not state that either case had
articulated the appropriate standard of care for children in state custody.182
Because the deliberate indifference standard is rooted in the Eighth
Amendment and the criminal justice system, its application is wholly
inappropriate to children in foster care who are being protected, not
punished, by the state. 183 Children are neither legally nor developmentally
adults. They have no say over their placement in foster care, whereas both
adult mental patients and prisoners can petition to have their cases
reviewed. Children also have particular needs for security, stability,
interaction, and stimuli to assure their healthy development. 184 The
environment children grow up in can be determinative of their personality
and performance.185 The importance of this comes alive when examining
the tragic outcomes of foster care youth, as discussed in Part I of this
Comment. 186
A new and higher standard should be created to replace deliberate
indifference and professional judgment. 187 A clear standard would help
state agencies know where they stand on liability issues and would allow
for better training of child protective workers. 188 In his dissent in K.H ex
rel. Murphy v. Morgan, Judge Coffey advocated for a duty to provide
appropriate care and respond to the needs of children judged by a standard
of reasonable professional judgment. 189 A shift in the burden of proof

182. See Kearse, supra note 54, at 405.
183. Even in Youngberg, the Court found deliberate indifference inappropriately harsh to
apply to mental patients who had not done anything wrong and should not be punished. 457
U.S. 307, 316 (1982).
184. See generally JOHN BOWLBY, A SECURE BASE: CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF
ATTACHMENT THEORY 119-36 (2003). Bowlby’s attachment theory explores how a child’s
earliest attachments are his or her foundation for later relationships. Id. at 126-27. Once
these patterns of interaction are formed, it is hard to alter them because they operate at an
unconscious level. Id. at 130.
185. See generally id. at 119-36.
186. See supra Part I.
187. See Dine, supra note 158, at 515-16; Kearse, supra note 54, at 410.
188. See Laura A. Harper, The State’s Duty to Children in Foster Care—Bearing the
Burden of Protecting Children, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 793, 812 (2003).
189. 914 F.2d 846, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1990) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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toward a rebuttable presumption that a caseworker did not use professional
judgment may also be necessary. 190 Such a standard would be more
applicable to children and their unique needs. Unfortunately, a higher
standard like the one Judge Coffey described would place a financial
burden on an already overwhelmed system. 191 It might also create a
disincentive for workers to remove children from their dangerous
biological parents in fear of taking on responsibility for that child’s
needs. 192 As the majority held in K.H., at the root of the problems with the
current child welfare system stem is a lack of financial resources.
PART IV: AN EXPLANATION FOR THE LACK OF A CLEAR STANDARD:
AN IGNORED, UNDERVALUED, AND INADEQUATE CHILD PROTECTIVE
SYSTEM
As discussed above, courts have yet to address the failures of the child
welfare system in a uniform manner. Courts have been slow to recognize
children’s civil rights claims and hesitant to expand causes of action that
would allow children to recover for violations of their basic rights.193 This
may stem from a reluctance to burden an already overwhelmed system with
claims of liability or to question the decisions of caseworkers whom judges
assume know more about child welfare than the courts. But it may also
reflect an underlying sentiment in the legal community that children’s
rights and the violation of these rights are not a priority. 194
A. Child Welfare Agencies are Disorganized, Chaotic, and Inadequate
It is easy to understand why child protective agencies and caseworkers
may fail to protect children. Agencies are mammoth organizations that are
disorganized, lacking in direction, and in desperate need of funding.195
Caseworkers at these agencies are poorly paid, overburdened with cases,
and generally not prepared or trained for the difficult nature of their
work. 196 Child protective workers are rarely social workers holding
masters degrees in the field. 197 The child protective system has become de-

190. See Dine, supra note 158, at 516.
191. See Harper, supra note 188, at 812. Advocates for children’s rights propose that this
is a concern for the legislature and not for the courts. Id.
192. Id.
193. See supra Part III.
194. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
195. See Mushlin, supra note 14, at 201, 212-13.
196. Id. at 213.
197. See generally HANK ORENSTEIN, PUTTING SOCIAL WORK BACK INTO CHILD WELFARE
(Apr. 2000), at http://www.naswnyc.org/c31.html (last viewed Oct. 14, 2005).
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professionalized, as trained social workers leave the field to pursue more
lucrative employment, often as private practitioners. 198 One author noted
that the requirements to become a caseworker are now less stringent than
the requirements to become a foster parent.199 The training that the agency
does provide these caseworkers is often insufficient.200 Supervisors, who
sometimes are social workers, are often equally overburdened and can’t
always step in when caseworkers need them. 201
The standards of procedure that these workers follow are “less than
specific, not terribly uniform, and vary with the specific stages of
intervention and official action involved.” 202 One former worker described
the standards of procedure as “incoherent.” 203 These standards are fluid
and differ between supervisors, departments, and localities.204 Workers’
decisions often depend more on the individual worker than on the facts of
the case. 205 Though some workers make sure their decisions are thought
out and rational, the elasticity of the standards, combined with inexperience
and lack of training, makes it easy for less conscientious workers to justify
poor decisions. 206 Though ASFA guidelines are much more precise, states
do not always meet them. 207 Doctoring records has become increasingly
common as caseworkers and agencies strive to meet ASFA’s high
standards. 208
B. Courts Are Hesitant to Articulate a Clear and Higher Standard of
Liability
Federal courts have generally been reluctant to enforce legal standards of

198. See CAL. STATE UNIV. AT FRESNO, HISTORICAL REVIEW: THE CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS
,
at
http://www.csufresno.edu/socwork/ive/Historical.Review.Curriculum.Dev.html (last viewed Oct. 14, 2005).
199. Levesque, supra note 11, at 11.
200. See Mushlin, supra note 14, at 209-10.
201. See id.
202. See Daniel L. Skoler, A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster Care?—Time for the
Supreme Court to Pay Its I.O.U., 18 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 377 (1991).
203. Mundorff, supra note 1, at 152.
204. Id. at 153 (charging that inconsistency between and within child welfare systems can
partially be attributed to lack of clear standards).
205. Id.
206. See generally Weddle & Lansner, supra note 36.
207. See supra note 4.
208. See Leslie Kaufman, City to Sever Two Contracts for Foster Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
3, 2005, at B1 (reporting that a foster care agency had falsified records to hide failures to
perform duties); Andrea Neal, More Caseworkers Won’t Solve Problems With System,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 26, 2005, at A10 (reporting that a caseworker lied and failed to
follow procedure).
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care or hold governmental actors liable for failing to protect children in
their care. 209 Claims asserting Section 1983 liability for failure to protect
are similar to common law tort claims, and the Supreme Court has held that
the Constitution cannot replace tort law by laying down rules of conduct.210
In addition, the judicial system might be reluctant to judge decisions that
are considered to be based on professional knowledge. In Youngberg, the
Court stated that “there certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are
better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such
Ironically, the child welfare profession has dedecisions.” 211
professionalized, as noted above. 212 Those making the “professional
decisions” often do not hold any higher qualifications in the field of child
welfare than the judges reviewing them. Caseworkers often act on gut
instinct or simply follow protocol without evaluating their possible options,
as a professional social worker would. 213
It also may be harder for courts to believe that caseworkers harm
children than it is for courts to believe that a prison guard would be
deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s needs.214 Courts often seem equally
sympathetic to defendant caseworkers and plaintiff foster children. The
District of Columbia Circuit found the defendants in LaShawn A. v. Dixon
to be “beleaguered city employees trying their best . . . while plagued with
excessive caseloads, staff shortages, and budgetary constraints.”215 The
Seventh Circuit wrote that caseworkers walked on a “razor’s edge,” facing
liability if they return a child to his or her family and if they place him or
her in foster care. 216 Out of sympathy for the caseworkers’ plight, and
possibly a feeling that these workers lacked the appropriate culpability, the
court allowed the caseworkers to escape liability by demonstrating
financial or other professional considerations that proved to be a solid
rationale for their poor decisions. 217

209. See generally Armacost, supra note 43, at 985 (showing that federal courts have
generally been reluctant to enforce these standards).
210. See Berry, supra note 39, at 886.
211. 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
212. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
213. See generally Mundoroff, supra note 1.
214. Mushlin, supra note 14, at 231-32.
215. 762 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
216. K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990).
217. Id. at 853-54.
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C. Recognizing the Importance of Children’s Issues: ReProfessionalizing the Child Welfare System
While it is easy to sympathize with child protective workers, we must
remember that their mistakes sometimes result in children’s deaths. For
any real change to occur, lawyers, judges, and social workers must return to
the field of child protective services. Without these trained professionals,
the field will continue to stagger along without direction. The legal
community in particular must alter the way it views children’s rights and
articulate a clear and definitive standard of what the state must provide to
children in its care. In 1974, Congress established a statutory right for
children to be represented in court through the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA). 218 In 1993, the ABA urged its members to treat
children as they would any other clients, identifying the legal issues
affecting children as a deficiency in legal education.219 Yet the mainstream
legal community has never embraced children’s rights. 220 There is a
“perception by the bar that legal matters directly involving children are
‘kiddie matters’—at best, professional stepping-stones for the young and
inexperienced, at worst, punishment for inadequate or unmotivated
practitioners.” 221 Like caseworkers, attorneys that represent children are
poorly paid and overloaded with cases.
The lack of attention and respect the legal community pays to children’s
issues adds to the chaos of the child welfare system. As discussed above,
when children bring claims against this system, courts address them in an
extremely non-uniform manner. Children often cannot recover, and
caseworkers rarely know when they are at risk for liability. The perception
that children’s issues are unimportant creates a feeling that the foster care
system is not a place for professionals. This often increases the reluctance
qualified lawyers and social workers already have about working in this
system. It also frustrates the few strong souls who do choose to advocate
for children.

218. See Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in
Child Protection Proceedings Should Be Represented by Lawyers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 1
(2000). Not all legal scholars, however, believe that children need attorneys. For more on
this debate, see Mandelbaum’s discussion of Professors Martin Guggenheim and Emily
Buss. Id. at 37-46.
219. See Jennifer R. Gavin, Child Welfare Law Curricula in Legal Education:
Massachusetts’ Untried Opportunity, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 9, 19 (1998).
220. Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy:
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 449, 453
(1996) (calling lawyers who advocate for children’s rights “kiddie libbers”).
221. See Gavin, supra note 219, at 18 (quoting REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S MA. BAR
ASS’N COMM’N ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN 16 (1987)).

BALMERCHRISTENSEN

2005

2/3/2011 10:05 PM

FOSTER FAILURE

129

Highly qualified attorneys and social workers must be drawn back to a
field that desperately needs them. Skilled attorneys are needed to put
pressure on agencies to perform their duties. Governmental agencies need
professional social workers who can spot symptoms of child abuse and
appropriately counsel families. For child protective agencies to improve,
they must be valued as more than a wasteland of children of the underclass.
CONCLUSION
In 1979, Marian Wright Edelman called our foster care system a
“national disgrace.” 222 Over twenty-five years later, children are still dying
in state care. The courts must recognize their role in this tragedy and
establish a consistent and appropriate standard of care for children in foster
care. Neither the deliberate indifference nor the professional judgment
standard adequately addresses and applies to the needs of foster children.
A new standard must emerge that addresses children’s unique needs, and
child protective workers must be held accountable for failing to meet this
standard.
Yet we must also try to understand why those assigned to protect
children are failing at their task. Child protective workers, and also foster
children, are caught in a chaotic system that has been abandoned by the
professionals who are equipped to fix it. As lawyers or social workers, we
must become actively involved in changing this system. Advocates for
children must continue to push legislators to provide more financial support
to the child protection system. Attorneys can no longer dismiss children’s
issues as the frivolous work of young female attorneys, and social workers
cannot leave the hardest work for those untrained to do it. By reclaiming
the care of our children, we will send the message that in the United States,
children’s rights are human rights.

222. See Chaifetz, supra note 12, at 9.

